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COMES NOW, Defendant/Counter-Claimant/Appellant, Killgore Salmon River Fruit
Company (hereinafter "Killgore"), by and through its attorneys of record, Savviooth Law Offices,
PLLC, and submits this Appellant's Brief in the above-titled matter.
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE.
This case involves Daryl K. and Linda L. Mullinix's (hereinafter "Mullinix") repeated

attempts to divert water from the diversion and pipeline owned and controlled by Killgore located
near Whitebird, Idaho. These attempts first began when Mullinix attempted to cut into the pipeline
without the consent or knowledge of Killgore in 2007. When these attempts were denied, Mullinix
apologized for their actions. However, Mullinix then changed directions and sought their own water
right in the Snake River Basin Adjudication ("SRBA") to divert water from the same point of
diversion as Killgore on Joe Creek. Killgore objected to the claims of Mullinix and sought to have
their claims disallowed on the basis of forfeiture.

Killgore maintained that Mullinix's claim to a

water right from Joe Creek had been lost by forfeiture but agreed to resolve their dispute in the
SRBA because Mullinix agreed that their point of diversion from Joe Creek would be below the
Killgore point of diversion.

Killgore would not have resolved their objections in the SRBA if

Mullinix had not agreed to move their point of diversion below the Killgore point of diversion.
Indeed, a settlement was reached and a Settlement Agreement was executed in which Mullinix
specifically and unambiguously agreed that the their points of diversion on both Joe Creek and the
Salmon River would be below the Killgore points of diversion. 1

1 As

Killgore believed that this

discussed in more detail below, both parties also have water rights from the Salmon River
but the focus of this dispute has been the diversions from Joe Creek which is tributary to the Salmon
River.
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Settlement Agreement, which provided Mullinix with their own water rights to irrigate their land,
and their own point of diversion, resolved the matter and Mullinix could then pursue their options
of watering their own land with their own water rights.
However, despite the fact that Mullinix's prior attempts to connect to the Killgore pipeline
had been denied, despite the fact that Mullinix acknowledged that the pipeline was owned, operated
and controlled by Killgore, and despite the fact that Mullinix now had their own water rights to
divert and irrigate their property, Mullinix again attempted to connect to the Killgore pipeline at two
locations without the knowledge or consent of Killgore. Killgore disconnected Mullinix's latest
unauthorized attempts to divert from the pipeline and Killgore continued to maintain that Mullinix
have their own water rights and can install their own conveyance system to irrigate their property as
was agreed by the parties in the SRBA Settlement Agreement.

Instead of doing so, because

Mullinix contended it would be too costly, Mullinix initiated this lawsuit seeking an order that
Mullinix are allowed to use the pipeline owned and controlled by Killgore and/or Killgore are
required to furnish Mullinix water pursuant to LC. § 42-912.
Following a two day court trial, Honorable John R. Stegner presiding, the district court held
that Mullinix had a right to install a tap or diversion in the Killgore pipeline. The district court held
that the Settlement Agreement was binding in that Mullinix' s right to receive water from the pipe Iine
remains inferior to the right of Killgore to divert and receive water from the pipeline. However,
because Mullinix had no right to install a second point of diversion below the Killgore point of
diversion, a condition which was required by the same Settlement Agreement, Killgore must furnish
Mullinix their water right from the Killgore point of diversion and the Killgore pipeline pursuant
to LC.§ 42-912. Killgore appeals this decision of the district court.
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B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION.
On May 25, 2012, Mullinix filed Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, and

Damages against Killgore. (R. pgs. 9-39.) The initial Complaint filed by Mullinix alleged three
causes of action for Declaratory Relief, Injunctive Relief and Tortious Injury to Property/Property
Rights. Id.
On June 18, 2012, Killgore filed an Answer and Counterclaim. (R. pgs. 40-81.) In the
Answer, Killgore denied the claims of Mullinix and asserted multiple affirmative defenses which
included, waiver, !aches, abandonment, estoppet the use was not adverse and was not for the
prescriptive period (R. pgs. 44-45). In the Counterclaim, Killgore alleged five causes of action for
Quiet Title to Easement, Breach of Settlement Agreement, Conversion, Interference with Easement
and Water Rights, and Injunctive and Affirmative Relief. (R. pgs. 40-81 ).
On June 28, 2012, Mullinix filed an Answer to Counterclaim which denied the claims of
Killgore and asserted the same affirmative defenses raised by Killgore. (R. pgs. 82-90). On
December 10, 2012, Mullinix filed an Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief,
and Damages against Killogre. (R. pgs. 91-122). The Amended Complaint added an additional
cause of action for"Killgore's Obligation to Furnish Water to Mullinix under Idaho Code§ 42-912."
(R. pgs. 100-101).2 On January 17, 2013, Killgore filed an Answer to Plaintiffs' Amended
Complaint and Counterclaim Restated which again denied the claims of Mullinix, raised numerous
affirmative defenses and restated the Counterclaim previously filed. (R. pgs. 123-165). While not
in the record, the parties agreed that it was not necessary for Mullinix to file an Answer to the

2

Noticeably absent from Mullinix's pleadings was any claim or assertion of a right to
condemnation or that Mullinix was entitled to a guarantee under Article XV, Section 4 of the Idaho
Constitution or LC.§ 42-101.
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Killgore's Counterclaim Restated. The trial for this matter was set to begin on May 29, 2013 and
on May 22, 2013, the parties submitted a Joint Stipulation to Facts and Exhibits for the trial. (R. pgs.

I 66-175).
On May 29-30, 2013, a court trial was held before the district court, Honorable John R.
Stegner presiding. At the trial Mullinix presented testimony and evidence via the following
witnesses: Daryl K. Mullinix, Clyde Hanson, Carl Killgore and Dan Cook. In response, Killgore
presented testimony and evidence via the following witnesses: Carl Killgore, Heather Killgore and
Daryl K. Mullinix.
Following the conclusion of the trial, the Court heard closing arguments, via telephone on
May 31, 2013. At the conclusion of the closing arguments the district court "orally pronounced its
findings to the parties on the Court's conclusions and offered the parties the opportunity to work out
a mutually agreeable solution." (R. pgs. 227-228); see also (Tr. pgs. 79-83).
The district court's oral "findings to the parties on the [district court's] conclusions"
provided: ( 1) in order to reconcile the Settlement Agreement and the statutes and Constitution, the
district court must give effect to LC. § 42-912 and Article XV, Section 4 of the Idaho Constitution
which means Mullinix is entitled to an injunction authorizing his use and access to the delivery
system operated by Killgore (Tr. pgs. 79-80, lns. 24-6); (2) Killgore did tortiously injure the property
of Mullinix (Tr. pg. 80, Ins 7-9); and (3) Killgores have proven their case for their counterclaims of
breach of the Settlement Agreement, Conversion and Interference with Easement but the damages
for said claims are offset by the damages claimed by Mullinix (Tr. pg. 80, Ins. 10-19). The district
court then stated that it would like to see Mullinix install a second point of diversion/bubbler as this
would give effect to the Settlement Agreement and the requirement of the Mullinix diversion being
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below the Killgore diversion, but the district court recognized that Mullinix has no easement from
the underlying property owner, Ernie Robinson, and one would need to be obtained. (Tr. pgs. 80-81,
Ins. 22-13). The district court further stated that it would issue an easement to Killgore upon
submission of a survey and description and that Mullinix must post a $5,000 bond for the injunction
to be issued. (Tr. pgs. 82-83, Ins. 9-3).
Following the district court's oral pronouncement a hearing was set for July 8, 2013, and
counsel for Mullinix indicated that Mullinix was not able to obtain an easement from the underlying
fee title owner, Ernie Robinson, and requested the assistance of the district court to order Killgore
to provide assistance in Mullinix obtaining such an easement (Tr. pgs. 8-9, lns. 14-7). Counsel for
Killgore and the district court then had the following discussion about whether the district court can
order Killgore to obtain an easement for Mullinix' s point of diversion:
MR.FARRIS: As far as the easement, we understood your decision is that they had
to go get an easement if they wanted to put in a second diversion and bubbler. That
is a decision that they- I don't know what terms they have offered Mr. Robinson and
what they have done to procure that easement, if they have offered to pay for the
easement or what they have done. I don't know how you can order my clients to do
anything, that's a third party that they need to go negotiate and determine whether or
not they can get an easement from them.
THE COURT: Well, I don't know that I can order the Killgores to do that. That's a
new and different wrinkle in the case that I hadn't thought about, but the testimony
at the time of trial indicated to me that the most intelligent way to deal with this issue
was to have Mullinix put a point of diversion below Kill gores and have a bubbler that
was the same elevation as the Killgores' bubbler, and that that would have as little
impact on the pressure in the system. If you want me to give Mullinix a point of
diversion off of your pipe line on Mullinix's property, I can do that; but from my
prospective, it seemed to make the most sense for the mechanism to be put in above
the current bubbler and below Killgores' weir and that would have the lease impact
on the system.
But if you want me to - - there are only so many things I can do, Mr. Farris, and I will
do them, but I have to know that that's my only alternative. And when I have been
shown engineering evidence that suggests that one course of action makes the most
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sense, I try to implement what makes the most sense. But if the Kill gores are going
to prevent Mullinix from getting an easement from Robinson, then we will have to
go back to square one and I'll have to order that Mullinix tie into the diversion
system that's already in existence.
MR. FARRIS: Your Honor, I guess my response would be that that is something that
cannot happen with the current settlement agreement and his water right has to be
below theirs. So I think it's up to him. That's the problem that we have raised
throughout this course of proceedings that he's [picked his] poison here. And to
force him into the Mullinix - - I mean the Killgore point [of diversion], is not
consistent with the settlement agreement.
THE COURT: I disagree, Mr. Farris. You are going to give me an option that you
don't like, but I will take that option. I get to decide these cases and I have decided
this case. Now, you have a choice and your client has a choice, they can either
work with Mullinix and Robinson and put a new bubbler in at the same
elevation as the existing bubbler with a point of diversion below Killgores' point
of diversion, or I'm going to allow Mullinix to tie into Killgores' water delivery
system. Pick your poison. You get to pick your poison.
MR. FARRIS: Well, your Honor, like I say I don't know what he's offered Mr.
Robinson and you are forcing, I guess, my clients to go procure an easement for him.
THE COURT: I'm not, but if you don't procure an easement or assist in the
procurement of an easement, I will issue an order allowing Mullinix to tie into
Killgores' water delivery system. It's that simple. And you can spend a lot of
money on a motion for reconsideration but you are going to lose.
MR. FARRIS: Okay. Fair enough.
THE COURT: So you have a choice, I think, Mr. Farris, and your client has a choice
either to work with Mullinix and Robinson to procure an easement, which from an
engineering standpoint seemed to make the most sense; or if there is no easement
available to Mr. Mullinix on Robinson's property, I'll issue an order authorizing
Mullinix to tie into the Killgore water delivery system. I don't know how else to put
it.
MR. FARRIS: I don't know what you want me to say at this point, your Honor.
THE COURT: You don't have to say anything.
MR. FARRIS: Issue your order and we will go from there, I guess, because I don't
know what - - what even assistance they are supposed to provide to go get him an
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - PAGE 6

easement and under what terms, under what conditions at this point.
THE COURT: So, Mr. Barker, would you submit a judgment to the effect that I have
authorized Mullinix to tie into the Killgores' water delivery system.
(Tr. pgs. 11-14, Ins. 6-23) (emphasis added); see also (R. pgs. 227-228, paragraph 4). 3
The parties were not able to work out "a mutually agreeable solution" as suggested in the
district court's oral findings, Mullinix was unable to obtain an easement from Ernie Robinson, and
on September 23, 2013, the district court issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (R. pgs.
221-232). The district court also issued a Decree on that same date. (R. pgs. 233-238).
The district court's decision is summarized as follows:
(1)

Mullinix has a water right for .4 cubic feet per second (cfs) from Joe Creek which is

inferior to Killgore's water right for 2.2 cfs from Joe Creek (R. pgs. 228, paragraph 5);
(2)

Killgore's unwillingness to allow Mullinix access to the Killgore pipeline across

Mullinix's property is without legal basis (Id.);
(3)

"Under Article XV, Section 4, of the Idaho Constitution, Mullinix, as successors in

interest to James and Josephine Killgore and Louis and Maude Weise, have a legal interest
in the continuing rights to water as guaranteed by Idaho's constitution" (R. pgs. 228-229,
paragraph 6);
(4)

"Under Idaho Code§ 42-101, Mullinix, as successor m interest to landheld

previously by both James and Josephine Killgore and Louis and [Maude] Weise, have a legal

3 This discussion is helpful to understand and appreciate how adamant the district court was to
allow Mullinix use of the Killgore diversion works and pipeline even though the Settlement Agreement,
which the district court found to be valid and enforceable, provided for Mullinix to have their own point
of diversion below Killgore's point of diversion. lt also clearly demonstrates that Mullinix did not have a
prior right to the diversion works and pipeline of Killgore given the district court's determination that
Mullinix must obtain their own easement rights from the underlying property owner.
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interest in the continuing water rights as established by Idaho statute." (R. pg. 229,
paragraph 6);
(5)

Authorization to place a separate diversion and bubbler on the property owned by

Ernie Robinson has not been obtained by Mullinix (R. pg. 229, paragraph 7);
(6)

Killgore "owns and controls" the irrigation system (consisting of the pipeline and

diversion) that crosses the Mullinix property, Killgore distributes a portion of the Killgore
water right from Joe Creek under a sale or rental to lot owners in Killgore' s Horseshoe Bend
Estates subdivision pursuant to written agreements (R. pg. 230, paragraphs 8);
(7)

Killgore must furnish Mullinix's water right to Mullinix's parcel pursuant to LC. §

42-912 but Killgore shall continue to have superior title to 2.2 cfs and Mullinix's right to .4
cfs would terminate at such time as flows in Joe Creek declined to 2.2 cfs or less (R. pg. 230,
paragraph 8-9);
(8)

Killgore is entitled to an easement, fifteen feet in width, across the property of

Mullinix "to do whatever is reasonable and necessary to maintain its pipeline" and said
easement is described in the survey dated 26 August 2013 (R. pg. 231, paragraph 10); and
(9)

The district court also retained jurisdiction over the matter to ensure that the terms

are carried out (R. pg. 234, paragraph 4).
Mullinix subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that Mullinix should be
entitled to be furnished water from the Killgore' s water right (Tr. pgs. 93-94, lns. 5-16)4 and that

Mullinix's Motion was perplexing to say the least given that Mullinix had not previously
argued that they were entitled to receive water from the Killgore water right, they had agreed in the
Settlement Agreement to their own water with a diversion below the Killgore water right, and the water
right ultimately decreed by the SRBA Court to Killgore did not include the Mullinix property in the place
of use. Moreover, the testimony of Mr. Mullinix was clear that he had his own water right which was
4
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Mullinix should be entitled to divert water from the Killgore pipeline when Killgore's are not using
their water right (Tr. pg. 92, lns. 7-16). With regard to the first issue, the district court rejected
Mullinix's motion and stated: "I don't think Mr. Mullinix can say he was junior to the 2.2 cubic feet
per second allocated to Killgore and then now say, oh, and by the way my .4 comes from their 2.2.
That strikes me as an absurd result." (Tr. pg. 103, lns. 19-24). 5 With regard to the second issue,
which involved a question of administration and not whether Mullinix is entitled to be furnished
water by Killgore when they are not using all of their water, the district court took the matter under
advisement (Tr. pg. 122, lns. 10-16). The district court has not issued a \,vTitten decision or amended
its findings of fact, conclusions of law or decree as requested by Mullinix.
Mullinix also filed a memorandum of costs asserting Mullinix is entitled to recovery of their
costs and attorney fees as the prevailing party.

The district court denied Mullinix's request for

attorney fees but awarded costs in the amount of $564.48 to Mullinix as the prevailing party (R. pgs.
263-267).
Killgore filed a Notice of Appeal on November 1, 2013. (R. pgs. 249-253.) Killgore
subsequently filed an Amended Notice of Appeal pursuant to I.A.R. l 7(m) on December 16, 2013
for the purpose of requesting additional transcripts and items to the record (R. pgs. 268-272).
II
II

inferior to the use of Killgore. (Tr. pgs. 256-257, Ins. 25-8).
Interestingly, it struck the district court as absurd that Mullinix agreed they were inferior or
junior to the Killgore water right and then argue they are entitled to the water allocated to Killgore, but it
apparently does not strike the district court as absurd that Mullinix agreed to have their point of diversion
below the Killgore point of diversion and they still argue they are entitled to be furnished water from the
Killgore point of diversion and pipeline.
5
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C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.

A.

Property Ownership and Development of Conveyance System.
1.

In early 1960s, James and Josephine Killgore, Killgore's predecessor in interest,

purchased land located along the Salmon River in Idaho County, Idaho. (R. pg. 167 and 221,
paragraph 1). 6 This real property included the approximately 20.1 acres ofreal property currently
owned by Mullinix. (R. pg. 167 and 222, paragraph 3 ).

However, shortly thereafter, in 1964,

Killgore conveyed the approximately 20. l acres currently owned by Mullinix to a third party, Louis
Weise and Maude Weise. Id. 14, see also Exhibit 1. 7
2.

In or about 1964 or 1965, Killgore began constructing and installing an earthen ditch

from Joe Creek to the property owned by Killgore (Tr. pg. 453-455, lns. 13-16) see also (R. pg. 168
and 223-224, paragraph 14). Les Killgore and Carl Killgore were both involved in the construction
of said irrigation ditch (Tr. pgs. 455-456, lns. 17-13). The ditch was constructed from Joe Creek,
along the hillside, across the now Mullinix property to a pond which allowed the diversion and use
of the water on the Killgore property (Tr. pgs. 455-460, lns. 23-9) see also (R. pg. 169 and 224,
paragraph 15).

Les and Carl Kilgore used heavy equipment to excavate and build the ditch and

conveyance system. (Id). There was a slightly visible ditch when they built the new earth ditch (Tr.
pg. 454, lns. 3-20).

The earthen ditch was constructed across a portion of the now Mullinix

References in these Statement of Facts to the Record involve the Joint Stipulation of Facts
entered between the parties prior to the trial and which were adopted by the district court in its Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
6

The district court suggests in its findings of fact and conclusions of law that Mullinix's rights
derive in part that its predecessor was Louis and Maude Weise even though Weise had no interest in the
remaining parcel or what is now known as the Killgore parcel. In other words, the property and title was
clearly separated between what is now the Mullinix parcel and the Killgore parcel in 1964.
7
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property. (R. pg. 169 and 224, paragraph 15) .
3.

The earthen ditch constructed by Les and Carl Killgore delivered water from Joe

Creek to the Mullinix property only one year, 1966, when there were potatoes grown on the property.
(Tr. pg. 461-462, lns. 4-22) see also (R. pg. 169 and 224, paragraph 16). However, the property now
owned by Mullinix was not irrigated directly from the earthen ditch; it was irrigated by pumping
water from the pond located to the east of the now Mullinix property (Tr. pg. 462, lns. 6-17) see also
(R. pg. 169 and 224, paragraph 16). Thus, other than the one year in 1966 there as been no water
delivered from the earthen ditch constructed by Killgore, or the subsequently installed pipeline, to
the Mullinix property.
4.

In or about 1972, eight years after Killgore had conveyed the now Mullinix property

to Weise, and after any use of the earthen ditch on the now Mullinix property, the owners of the
property where the point of diversion from Joe Creek is located, (Killgore's did not purchase or ovvn
the real property where the diversion works were installed or the first eight hundred feet where the
earthen ditch was constructed) Earnest and Judith Robinson, granted Killgore an "exclusive"
easement for the earthen ditch.

(Tr. pgs. 489-490, Ins. 6-11 ), see also Exhibit F. Again, this

easement was granted to Killgore after Killgore had sold off the now Mullinix property and after any
use of the ditch on the Mullinix property was discontinued. This easement was never intended for
what is now Mullinix property and from 1972 to present water had not been used on the Mullinix
property via the earthen ditch or pipeline (Tr. pgs. 520-521, Ins. 8-6).
5.

From 1965 to 1987, Killgore used, operated, maintained and accessed the earthen

ditch and diversion works on Joe Creek to convey water from Joe Creek to lands owned by Killgore
for irrigation purposes. With the exception of the one year mentioned above in 1966, this use did
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not include the diversion and use of irrigation water on the Mullinix property. This was also
confirmed by Mullinix's own witness, Mr. Clyde Hanson (Tr. pgs. 350-351, lns. 22-11). However,
the earthen ditch continued to cross the Mullinix property and Killgore openly and continuously
accessed, operated and maintained the ditch across the Mullinix property (Tr. pg. 464, lns. 19-25).
6.

In 1987, as a result of slides, washouts and maintenance concerns with the earthen

ditch, Killgore placed the earthen ditch in pressurized pipe (Tr. pg. 351-352, Ins. 12-3; pgs. 465-467,
lns. 4-15) see also (R. pgs. 169 and 224, paragraphs 17 and 18). To do so, Killgore installed new
diversion works farther upstream on Joe Creek to create more fall and to pressurize the pipeline (Tr.
pgs. 351-352, Ins. 25-8). 8 Using heavy equipment and hand labor, Killgore installed the pipeline
in the same general location as the earthen ditch which diverted water from Joe Creek (on property
owned by Robinson, and as part of their exclusive easement) around the hillside, across the property
now owned by Mullinix, across Highway 95, up a hillside and then to the property owned by
Killgore for irrigation purposes. (Tr. pgs. 467-468, Ins. 19-20). The pipeline is pressurized and does
not include an outlet to the Mullinix property (Tr. pg. 352, lns. 9-19) see also (R. pgs. 169 and 224,
paragraph 18) . From approximately 1987 to 2000, the pressurized pipeline was accessed, operated
and maintained across the Mullinix property, without any use by the Mullinix property, to deliver
irrigation water from Joe Creek to the Killgore property (Tr. pgs. 471-472, lns. 16-2). From 2000 to
present day, the pipeline delivers irrigation water from Joe Creek to the Killgore property via the

8

Killgore contend that this is an important fact to keep in mind in that the point of diversion in
Joe Creek moved upstream several hundred feet when the pipeline was installed in 1987 and there is no
dispute or disagreement that the pipeline did not include an outlet for Mullinix's property. Thus, there
would be no prior right or use by Mullinix or their predecessors from the pipeline or the new point of
diversion on Joe Creek after 1987 and Mullinix's property has~ received water from the current
point of diversion in Joe Creek.
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pipeline. However, since 2000 portions of the Killgore property has been sold to third parties. (R.
pgs. 171 and 226-227, paragraph 31 ).
7.

The third parties referenced above are landowners which have purchased portions of

the Killgore property which have been receiving irrigation water from Joe Creek via the pressurized
pipeline. As Killgore developed and sold the parcels which had been receiving irrigation water from
the pressurized pipeline (again Mullinix's property has never received water from the pipeline)
Killgore entered into agreements with the third party landowners which "assigned" an interest in the
irrigation system. See Exhibits 33A-33H. The Irrigation Agreement with the landowners provided
the landowners with the option to "share" the irrigation water previously delivered to said lands in
exchange for their commitment to share in the operation and maintenance of the irrigation system.
(Id). There is no sale or rental of the water as Killgore was simply allowing property owners which

had purchased land already being delivered water from the pipeline the continued use of the pipeline
and water (Id). The Mullinix property, on the other hand, had never received water from the pipeline.
The agreements do no limit the lot owners use to only one-half acre but rather provide that they can
irrigate their entire property (Id). 9
B.

Mullinix's Attempts to Divert from the Pipeline.
8.

Mullinix purchased his property in 2002 (R. pg. 167 and 222, paragraph 4) see also

Exhibit 5. In 2007, Mullinix attempted to illegally divert water from the Killgore pipeline without
the knowledge of Killgore (Tr. pg. 268, Ins. 5-16). This is after Killgore had previously informed
Mullinix that he was not allowed to use the pipeline (Tr. pg. 268, Ins. 5-25). When these

9

Page one of the Irrigation Agreement references ½ acre of use but then provides on page two
that power and maintenance will be shared by each acre on a pro-rata basis.
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unauthorized attempts were discovered, Killgore, by and through present counsel, sent a letter to
Mullinix demanding that he cease and desist any further attempts to divert water from the pipeline.
(R. pg. 171, paragraph 33.a) see also Exhibit 34. Mullinix responded by acknowledging he had no
right to utilize the pipeline and apologizing profusely for his actions.

(R. pg. 172, paragraph 33.b)

see also Exhibit 35. The district court characterized the letter by Mullinix to "disclaim any right to

the pipe" (Tr. pg. 334, lns. 5-10). However, a year later, Mullinix again attempted to divert water
from the pipeline and Killgore again, by and through present counsel, informed Mullinix that he was
not allowed to utilize the pipeline or diversion works and again demanded that he cease and desist
any further attempts to do so.

C.

(R. pg. 172, paragraph 33.c) see also Exhibit 36.

SRBA Water Rights and Settlement Agreement.

9.

After Killgore had rebuffed Mullinix's attempts to illegally divert water from the

Killgore pipeline, Mullinix filed a claim for a separate water right from Joe Creek and a separate
water right from the Salmon River (Killgore has two water rights - one from Joe Creek and another
from the Salmon River. The Salmon River right is utilized when flows decrease on Joe Creek and
is not the primary source because of pumping costs).

See Exhibit 27. Killgore objected to

Mullinix's separate water right claims because, among other things, the Mullinix property had not
been irrigated from Joe Creek or the Salmon River except for one year in the I 960s and thus the
water right was forfeited (Tr. pgs. 280-281, lns. 23-1; pg. 543, lns. 2-8). As discussed, supra, the
Mullinix property never utilized water from the Killgore diversion works and Killgore contended
that the water right should be disallowed.
10.

However, despite the fact that Killgore argued that the Mullinix claims should be

disallowed due to forfeiture, on or about March 25, 2011 the parties entered into a Settlement
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Agreement resolving their conflicting water right claims.

See Exhibit 27. Said Settlement

Agreement, provides, in part, that: "Mullinix agrees to move the point of diversion for Water Right
No. 79-14234 to a location on Joe Creek below the current diversion used by Killgores for Water
Right No. 79-14233." (Id). Killgore would not have resolved the protest to Mullinix's water right
claim if Mullinix continued to assert a right to use the same point of diversion as the Killgore water
right or the right to use the Killgore pipeline. (Tr. pgs. 545-546, lns. 3-16 see also Exhibit 27).
11.

Mullinix was partially decreed the separate water right from the Salmon River, with

the same condition in the Settlement Agreement that the Mullinix point of diversion is downstream
of the Killgore diversion, and Mullinix has installed the point of diversion downstream, as agreed,
has a pump with power to divert water from the Salmon River to irrigate his property, and has
constructed an irrigation system which allows Mullinix to divert water from the Salmon River to
irrigate his property. Thus, Mullinix has his own water right to irrigate his property and a means to
do so.
D.

Mullinix's Attempts to Divert from the Pipeline After the Settlement Agreement.

12.

Mullinix acknowledges that the Settlement Agreement did not require Killgore to

furnish Mullinix water, speak to the use of the pipeline by Mullinix or contain a contingent provision
if Mullinix could not install their own diversion and pipeline. (Tr. pgs. 282-283, lns. 15-6). In fact,
following the Settlement Agreement, Mullinix then proceeded to purchase pipe for their own
pipeline and diversion from Joe Creek (Tr. pg. 283, lns. 12-23). Mullinix also sought bids to install
their own diversion and pipe. (Tr. pg. 285, lns. 10-18); see also Exhibit 50.

Mulinix however

abandoned the idea to install their own diversion and pipeline because they contend it was too costly
(Tr. Pg. 287, lns. 10-21 ). It is worth noting that Mullinix never did determine the cost. (Tr. pg. 314,
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Ins. 7-20). It is also worth noting that the testimony from Mullinix's own witness was that they
could install their own diversion and pipeline using different methods such as digging by hand or
installing the pipeline above ground (Tr. pgs. 432-434, lns. 3-21 ).
13.

Despite the Settlement Agreement, despite Mullinix having his own water rights,

despite Mullinix acknowledging that he had no right to divert water from the Killgore pipeline,
Mullinix began irrigating from the Killgore pipeline (Tr. pg. 301-303, Ins. 5-16). Mullinix's
irrigation occurred after the Settlement Agreement in which they agreed to a point of diversion below
the Killgore point of diversion and Mullinix acknowledged they had not constructed their own point
of diversion below the Killgore point of diversion. io (Id). When Killgore learned of this latest
attempt, Killgore again disconnected Mullinix's unauthorized diversions and again demanded that
the diversion of water from Killgore's point of diversion and pipeline must cease.
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Killgore raises the following issues on appeal:
1.

Whether the District Court erred in holding that Mullinix have a right to use the

diversion and/or pipeline of Killgore, and whether said holding is supported by substantial and
competent evidence?
2.

Whether the District Court erred in concluding that Mullinix have a right to use the

diversion and/or pipeline of Killgore pursuant to Article XV, Section 4 of the Idaho Constitution or

The district court mentions that its order is based upon its "equitable powers" without any
further explanation (R. pg. 228, paragraph 8). Killgore suggest that the issues and conclusions do not
involve equitable remedies but to the extent any equitable considerations are given Mullinix's conduct of
repeatedly connecting to the Killgore pipeline, without consent, would clearly be inappropriate conduct.
This is further demonstrated by the fact that Mullinix irrigated from the Killgore pipeline after they
specifically agreed to install their own point of diversion below the Killgore point of diversion and they
failed to do so. This type of conduct cannot and should not be awarded any equitable consideration.
'0
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Idaho Code § 42-10 l, and whether said conclusion is supported by substantial and competent
evidence?
3.

Whether the District Court erred in concluding that Killgore has an obligation to

furnish to Mullinix the Mullinix' s own water right under Idaho Code § 42-912, and whether said
conclusion is supported by substantial and competent evidence?
4.

Whether the District Court erred in concluding that Killgore tortiously injured the

property of Mullinix by disconnecting Mullinix from the Killgore pipeline, and whether said
conclusion is supported by substantial and competent evidence?
5.

Whether the District Court erred in concluding that Killgore's damages for breach

of the settlement agreement conversion and interference with easement were offset by the damages
claimed by Mullinix, and whether said conclusion is supported by substantial and competent
evidence?
6.

Whether the District Court erred in concluding that Mullinix was the prevailing party

and entitled to costs?
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing the district court's decision following a court trial. the appellate court's:
decision is limited to ascertaining whether the evidence supports the findings of fact,
and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law. A district court's
findings of fact in a bench trial will be liberally construed on appeal in favor of the
judgment entered, in view of the district court's role as trier of fact. It is the province
of the district judge acting as trier of fact to weigh conflicting evidence and testimony
and to judge the credibility of the witnesses. [The appellate court] will not substitute
[its] view of the facts for the view of the district court. Instead, where findings of
fact are based on substantial evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting, those
findings will not be overturned on appeal. [The appellate courts] exercise free review
over the lower court's conclusions oflaw, however, to determine whether the court
correctly stated the applicable law, and whether the legal conclusions are sustained
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by the facts found.

Nampa & A1eridian Irrigation Districtv. Washington Federal Savings, 135 Idaho 518,521, 20 P.3d
702, 705 (2001) (citations omitted).

IV. ARGUMENT
The district court's decisions contradict themselves in that the district court has found the
Settlement Agreement to be binding and enforceable, which requires Mullinix to install a point of
diversion for their own water below the Killgore point of diversion, found that a second point of
diversion and separate bubbler would be the best and most effective way for delivery of the Mullinix
right to the Mullinix parcel and found that Mullinix would need an easement from the underlying
fee title property owner. but yet because Mullinix did not have an easement from the underlying fee
title owner, Killgore must furnish Mullinix their water right from the Killgore point of diversion and
through the pipeline owned and operated by Killgore. The district court's decision raises a threshold
question as to whether Mullinix has a prior right to the Killgore diversion and pipeline. Killgore
contend Mullinix's property has never received water from the current Killgore point of diversion,
from the pipeline owned and operated by Killgore. and thus there can be no continuing guarantee
under Article XV, Section 4 of the Idaho Constitution or LC. § 42-101.
A.

Mullinix Has No Prior Right to the Irrigation Pipe Owned and Operated by Killgore.
The district court held that Killgore' s unwillingness to allow Mullinix to use the pipeline

owned and controlled by Killgore was without legal basis and then held that under Article XV,
Section 4, of the Idaho Constitution and J.C. § 42-101, ''Mullinix, as successors in interest to James
and Josephine Killgore and Louis and Maude Weise, have a legal interest in the continuing rights
to water as guaranteed by Idaho's constitution" (R. pgs. 228-229, paragraphs 5-6). This decision
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is erroneous because it is not supported by the facts, or substantial competent evidence, is
contradictory to other aspects of the district court's decision and is erroneous as a matter of law.
While Mullinix is the successor in interest to James and Josephine Killgore, what is now the
Mullinix property was conveyed by James and Josephine Killgore to Louis and Maude Weise in
1964. Thus, there was a complete separation of title to what later became Killgore property and what
is now the Mullinix property in 1964 and common ownership of the property ceased. Importantly,
this transfer occurred before any water was diverted from the earthen ditch via the pond to the
Mullinix property for the one year in 1966. The evidence, as found by the district, stipulated by the
parties and confirmed via the testimony, was that the Mullinix property only received water via the
earthen ditch, after it had been delivered to a pond, one year in 1966. This one year of use, after
common ownership was severed, cannot and does not establish an easement right or any other right
to the earthen ditch. The statutory period for prescriptive easements would be a minimum of five
years and the current statute requires twenty (20) years of adverse use. See I.C. §§ 5-203 and 5-206.
Thus, there was no prior right created by the one year of use in 1966.
One thing worth noting is that Mullinix argued that there was evidence of prior use of the
ditch to provide water to the Mullinix property based upon water right filings by James Killgore, and
later by Heather Killgore, which included the Mullinix property in the claims. Heather Killgore
testified that these filings were incorrect in including the Mullinix property (Tr. pg. 603, lns. 9-23).
More importantly, the filings themselves are clearly incorrect in that each stated that the applicant
owned all of the property in the claimed place of use. See Exhibit 16, page 2, line 12 11 ; Exhibit 16,

11

"Do you own the property listed above as place of use? Yes." This was in 1988, after the ditch
had been piped, and after Killgore had sold the Mullinix property.
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page 5 and 6, first sentence; 12 Exhibit 20, page 15. 13 It is undisputed that Killgore did not own the
Mullinix property at the time of the filings and in some cases the applications or documents were
after 1987 when it was physically impossible for the Mullinix property to receive water from the
pipeline because there was no outlet. Thus, the mistake is evident from the documents themselves.
The overwhelming evidence of non-use on the Mullinix property is supported by the following:
a.

the Joint Stipulation of Facts and the district court's findings provide that the earthen
ditch provided water to the Mullinix property one year in 1966 (R. pg. 169 and 224,
paragraph 16);

b.

the one witness with specific knowledge of the use, Carl Killgore, specifically
recalled the only use being one year in 1966, and his testimony on this issue was not
challenged (Tr. pg. 461-462, Ins. 4-22);

c.

Mullinix's witness, Clyde Hanson, who was the engineer that assisted with the
construction and design of the earthen ditch testified there was no use on the
Mullinix property and the use was east of the highway, which is where Killgore still
owned the property (Tr. pgs. 350-351, Ins. 22-11);

d.

Once the pipeline was installed in 1987 there was no outlet for the Mullinix property
and it was physically impossible for the Mullinix property to receive water from the
pipeline with no outlet. This was confirmed by Carl Killgore and Clyde Hanson; (Tr.

12

"Killgore's Salmon River Fruit Co. owns the property close to my residence and place of
business." This was in 2004, after the ditch had been piped and Killgore did not own the Mullinix
property.
"I have lived on the Salmon River across from the property owned by Killgore's Salmon River
Fruit Co. since 1979." This was in 2002, after the ditch had been piped and Killgore did not own the
Mullinix property at any time referenced in this letter.
13
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pg. 471, Ins. 16-21; pgs. 351-352, Ins. 25-19); and
e.

Mr. Mullinix himself testified that he had no knowledge of his property ever
receiving water from the pipeline (Tr. pgs. 613, lns. 15-17).

The bottom line is that the substantial and overwhelming evidence and testimony was that
there was no use of the earthen ditch or pipeline other than one year in 1966.
1.

The Exclusive Easement of Killgore Prevents Mullinix's Claims

The district court's decision is further contradicted by the fact that Killgore obtained an
exclusive easement across the Robinson property in 1972. This exclusive easement was granted to
Killgore after Killgore had conveyed what is now the Mullinix property. The exclusive easement
was not appurtenant to or for the benefit of the Mullinix property as title had already been
transferred. In fact, by 1972 the Mullinix property was no longer owned by Louis and Maude Weise.
The exclusive easement, thus, defeats and extinguishes any and all claims by Mullinix that there is
some prior right to the earthen ditch, which was clearly not used on their property, because it was
exclusive and prevented Mullinix or their predecessors from using it. 14
2.

The Mullinix Property Has Never Received Water from the Pipeline or Current
Point of Diversion.

Again, there was no prior use from the earthen ditch on what is now the Mullinix property

14

Recently, this Court held that the erection of a permanent structure within a defined easement
is per se unreasonable. Johnson v. Highway 101 Investments, LLC, 2014 Opinion No. 9 (February 7,
2014). In this case, it is more than just a defined easement but is an exclusive easement and while a
permanent structure is not being placed in the easement, Mullinix is seeking to convey water in the
pipeline itself. See also l.C. § 42-1102 which provides that no person shall construct, install
encroachments within an irrigation right-of-way without the written permission of the right-of-way
owner. Installing a connection to the pipeline, using the right-of-way owner's diversion and pipeline,
would require the written permission of Killgore and conflicts with Mullinix's right to connect more than
twenty years later.
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while the property was owed by Killgore or its predecessor, but any such argument of prior use was
again cut off and distinguished when the pipeline was installed in 1987.

Despite Mullinix's

arguments that water right claims may have included what is now the Mullinix property, the
evidence is absolutely clear that the pipeline was installed across the Mullinix property with no outlet
or valve to the Mullinix property. Thus, from 1987 to present there has been no valve or diversion
method for the Mullinix property to receive water from the pipeline. Again, there is no prior right,
but to the extent one could be argued, the pipeline bypassed the Mullinix property and there was no
use from the pipeline on the Mullinix property.
Additionally, when the pipeline was constructed a new point of diversion was constructed
on Joe Creek. This is because the new pipeline was constructed further up Joe Creek to provide
more pressure. This stretch of the pipeline and the new point of diversion extend the pipeline up
Joe Creek and there is zero evidence that Mullinix or their predecessors have any right to use this
additional portion of the pipeline or the new point of diversion. Again, there is no evidence that
Mullinix or their predecessors have received water from the pipeline, including the new point of
diversion, since it was installed more than twenty seven years ago. Perhaps more importantly, the
district court has acknowledged that Mullinix has no prior right to the current point of diversion on
Joe Creek by insisting that Mullinix obtain an easement from the underlying property owner to install
their own point of di version. In other words, the district court suggested that it would like to enforce
the Settlement Agreement and require Mullinix to install their own, separate point of diversion as
required, but then the district recognizes that Mullinix has no right to do so.
II
II
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B.

The Settlement Agreement Precludes Mullinix from Claiming a Right to the Irrigation
Pipe Owned and Operated by Killgore.

Not only is the evidence clear that Mullinix has no prior right to the point of diversion or
pipeline owned and controlled by Killgore, but the district court erred in concluding such a prior
right existed after it had already found that Mullinix breached the Settlement Agreement.

The

Settlement Agreement clearly and unambiguously provided that Mullinx would have their own water
right and would install their own point of diversion below the Killgore point of diversion. The
district court concluded that Mullinix had breached said Settlement Agreement by their continued
attempts to divert water from the Killgore pipeline. Thus, Mullinix is barred from claiming a right
to the Killgore point of diversion by the Settlement Agreement.
Mullinix has correctly pointed out that the Settlement Agreement provides that it "shall not
be construed as a determination or acknowledgment of any party's right to an easement, right-of-way
or conveyance system." See Exhibit 27, pg. 2, paragraph 7. In other words, it leaves open the issue
of Mullinix's right to an easement, right-of-way or conveyance system and does not address those
issues one way or the other. However, this does not change or modify the fact that Mullinix agreed
not to use the same point of diversion as Killgore. The Settlement Agreement specifically did not
provide that Mullinix would be "furnished" water from the Killgore point of diversion or pipeline
and it was not contingent on Mullinix determining whether they could install their own diversion and
pipeline. (Tr. pgs. 282-283, lns. 23-6). Instead, it was clear that Mullinix could not use the same
point of diversion and in furtherance of the agreement Mullinix proceeded to purchase pipe and
obtain bids for the installation of their own diversion and conveyance system.
By virtue of Mullinix' s conduct, actions and the Settlement Agreement, Mullinix is also
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barred from claiming a prior right to the diversion and pipeline, even if one existed for arguments'
sake, under the doctrines of !aches, estoppel and waiver.
1.

Mullinix's Claims are Barred by the Doctrine of Laches.

In Sears v. Berryman, 101 Idaho 843, 847, 623 P.2d 455, 459 (1981 ), the court applied the
doctrine of laches and stated that:
The doctrine of laches is a creation of equity and is a species of equitable estoppel.
"Long and continuous knowing acquiescence in another's use and enjoyment of a
property or privilege may preclude one from subsequently asserting his claim.
However, "(l)apse of time is not alone sufficient to defeat a right on the ground of
!aches. It must be shown that the (claimant) has been misled, to his injury, by the
failure of the (holder of the right) to assert its right earlier."

Id. at 848,623 P.2d at 460. (citations omitted).
In Hillcrest Irr. Dist. v. Nampa & Aferidian Irr. Dist., 57 [daho 403, 408-409, 66 P.2d 115,
11 7 (193 7), the court found the existence of the elements oflaches and stated that respondents have

stood by, with full knowledge of all the facts, for more than twenty years and allowed the appellant
to proceed on the theory that it had valid title and a legal right to divert the water, and in the
meantime the appellant has incurred large indebtedness on the strength of its title. The "change of
point of diversion and use, whether regular and legal or not, was actually accomplished and
thereafter used and enjoyed adversely." Id. Here, Mullinix and/or their predecessors not only stood
by and allowed Killgore to construct and install a pipeline, operate and maintain the pipeline, but
then they chose to pursue their own water right and agreed they would not use the Killgore point of
diversion. Such acquiescence defeats Mullinix' s current claim of prior guaranteed right, or even
a right to be "furnished" water, under the doctrine of laches.

II
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2.

Mullinix's Claims are Barred by the Doctrines of Estoppel.

The doctrine of equitable estoppel requires: ( 1) a false representation or concealment of a
material fact made with actual or constructive knowledge of the truth; (2) that the party asserting
estoppel did not and could not have discovered the truth; (3) an intent that the misrepresentation or
concealment be relied upon; and (4) that the party asserting estoppel relied on the misrepresentation
or concealment to his or her detriment. Willig v. State, Dept. of Health & Welfare, 127 Idaho 259,
899 P .2d 969 ( 1995).
Further, the doctrine of quasi estoppel is distinguished from equitable estoppel "in that no
concealment or misrepresentation of existing facts on the one side, no ignorance or reliance on the
other, is a necessary ingredient.

The doctrine of quasi estoppel applies when it would be

unconscionable to allow a party to assert a right which is inconsistent with its prior position." Id. at
261,899 P.2d at 971. (citations omitted).
Here, it is plainly obvious that Mullinix has taken inconsistent positions which have been
relied upon by Killgore to their detriment. Mullinix claimed their own water right and when Killgore
disputed it on the grounds of forfeiture Mullinix entered into a Settlement Agreement in which they
would agree to move their point of diversion below the Killgore point of diversion. Mullinix's
claims to utilize the Killgore pipeline, be guaranteed delivery of water from the Killgore point of
diversion and pipeline, or be "furnished" water from the Killgore diversion and pipeline, are barred
under both doctrines of estoppel.
3.

Mullinix's Claims are Barred by the Doctrines of Waiver.

"Waiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right or advantage. Waiver
is foremost a question of intent." Seaport Citizens Bank v. Dippel, 112 Idaho 736, 735 P.2d 1047
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(Ct.App. 1987). The intention to waive must clearly appear and the doctrine of implied waiver by
silence is disfavored. This same element of intent creates a distinction between implied waiver and
estoppel. The distinction between an implied waiver and estoppel is that for a case ofimplied waiver
there must be: some conduct on the part of the person waiving from which it may be inferred that
the person waiving intended to waive; in other words, affirmative action on the part of the person
waiving indicating an intention to waive some benefit or advantage; whereas, in estoppel a barrier
is simply set up regardless of the parties' intentions which precludes on from asserting a right which
he would otherwise have but for the matters and things pleaded by the way of estoppel. Id. at 739,
735 P.2d at 1050.
Once again, Mullinix's actions of claiming and obtaining his own water right, entering into
an agreement in which they will not use the Killgore point of diversion clearly establishes his intent
to not use the Killgore point of diversion and pipeline. [tis only after Mullinix purchased pipe and
sought to obtain bids for the installation of their own diversion and pipeline that they claimed a right
to use the Killgore diversion and pipeline. Such a position is barred by the doctrine of waiver.

C.

The District Court Erred in Applying Article XV, Section 4 of the Idaho Constitution
and I.C. § 42-101.
Once it is determined Mullinix had no prior right then there is no continuing right to

guarantee. Article XV, Section 4 of the Idaho Constitution and LC.§ 42-101 arguably keep the door
open to a continuing right if such a right already exists but neither create a new right. In this case,
it is clear that Mullinix had no existing right in the Killgore point of diversion or pipeline and thus
Article XV, Section 4 of the Constitution and LC.§ 42-101 are inapplicable.
Article XV, Section 4 of the Idaho Constitution provides:
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Whenever any waters have been, or shall be, appropriated or used for agricultural
purposes, under a sale, rental, or distribution thereof, such sale, rental, or
distribution shall be deemed an exclusive dedication to such use; and whenever
such waters so dedicated shall have once been sold, rented or distributed to any
person who has settled upon or improved land for agricultural purposes with the
view of receiving the benefit of such water under such dedication, such person,
his heirs, executors, administrators, successors, or assigns, shall not thereafter,
without his consent, be deprived of the annual use of the same, when needed for
domestic purposes, or to irrigated the land so settled upon or improved, upon
payment therefor, and compliance with such equitable terms and conditions as to the
quantity used and times of use, as may be prescribed by law.
Emphasis added.
Idaho Code § 42-101, which provides for the nature of the property to use the water of the
State ofldaho provides in the last sentence that "the right to continue the use of any such water shall
never be denied or prevented from any other cause than failure on the part of the user thereof to pay
the ordinary charges or assessments which may be made to cover the expenses for delivery of such
water."
Here, there is no prior right to guarantee.

Killgore have not diverted, delivered or

appropriated water for the sale, rental or distribution to the Mullinix property. Mullinix has argued
that when Killgore developed and subdivided the property to the east, which does not include the
Mullinix property, in 2000 it was for sale or rental. Killgore disagree with this contention as
discussed, infra, but there has never been the suggestion, argument or contention that Killgore
appropriated water for sale or rental to what is now the Mullinix property. More specifically, there
is no evidence in the record to suggest that Killgore delivered water to what is now the Mullinix
property under the sale or rental that could be deemed an exclusive dedication or that could be
viewed as receiving a dedication. Article XV, Section 4 is quite simply inapplicable and there is
no evidence to support the district's court's conclusion that Mullinix has a legal interest to the
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continuing rights to water from the Killgore point of diversion or pipeline.
Moreover, Article XV, § 4 contemplates canal systems operated by irrigation districts or
canal companies that deliver water for "sale, rental or distribution" to lands under the ditches and
not private individuals establishing conveyance systems and water rights for delivery to their own
property.

This is evident in the following excerpt from "Proceedings and Debates of the

Constitutional Convention ofldaho, 1889 ," Volume II, p. 1178:
Mr. Claggett. I will state to the committee that the heart of this bill lies in
sections 5 (4) and 6 (5) as a practical measure. This portion of section 5 (4)
amounts to this: that whenever these canal owners - if the gentleman will see
'for agricultural purposes under a sale, rental or distribution thereof " whenever one of these large canals is taken out for the purpose of selling,
renting or distributing the water, or the appropriation is made hereafter for that
purpose, and that after that has been done, inasmuch as priorities will
immediately spring up along the line of that canal even before the canal is
located; for instance, if a company should start in here to take a large
quantity of water out to supply a given section of country, and should
appropriate or give notice to the world that they were appropriating it for
agricultural purposes 'under a sale, rental or distribution thereof,' then
immediately, just as soon as the ditch was surveyed, people would come
in and begin to locate farms and improve them right along the line of the
ditch; and therefore it is necessary in order to protect them, inasmuch as they
have spent this money in settling there under a promise, which was made by
the company that the water should be used for agricultural purposes - that the
water should not be allowed to be diverted from that purpose and applied to the
running of manufactories or anything else.
(Emphasis added). 15
At page 1180 of the Proceedings and Debates, Mr. Claggett again refers to the "agricultural
ditches, which are constructed for the purpose of selling the water or renting it or distributing it" and
the specifically states that "'Neither one of them applies to a case of a water right where a man

15

For ease of reference, the excerpts of the Constitutional Convention are attached hereto as

Exhibit I.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF - PAGE 28

takes water out and puts it upon his own farm." (Emphasis added). This section does not apply

to a situation, such as this one, where Killgore diverted water and put it on their o~'Il land.
In 1904, in construing Article XV, §§ 4 and 5, the Idaho Supreme Court reflected on the
relationship between the canal owners and the water users they serve:
Counsel for respondent earnestly insists that under the provisions of section 4 ... the
user has no property interest in the water which he has taken from the respondent's
canal. We cannot agree with this proposition.
The fundamental law as well as the statutes of our state have both attempted to
protect the canal owner as well as the user in their respective rights. In many
instances, and in the case at bar, they must depend upon each other to be successful
in their respective enterprises. The ditch should be valueless without users of the
waters along the canal, and the lands now supplied with water by the canal company
would be equally valueless without the canal to furnish water.
Hard v. Boise City Irr. Etc. Co. 9 Idaho 589, 596, 76 P. 331 (1904).
Here, this is not a situation where Killgore is an irrigation district, canal company or other
entity developing and appropriating water for sale or rental to third persons. Killgore developed a
water right and conveyance system for their o~ property and while they have subsequently split off
and subdivided the property beginning in 2000, or more than thirty five years later, Killgore are
clearly no a canal company envisioned by Article XV, Section 4 of the Idaho Constitution.
Mullinix and their property have not been included in the conveyance system and in fact now
have their o~ water right. In other words, Mullinix are not using the water right of Killgore but
rather have their

O\\<TI

water right.

Neither Article XV, Section 4 or LC. § 42-101 provide a

guarantee for delivery of a persons o~ water right or a guaranteed delivery system to convey said
water right. The district court erred in that there is no evidence to support its conclusion and it is an
error oflaw to suggest that either Article XV, Section 4 or LC. § 42-101 provide Mullinix with a
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continued and guaranteed right to use the di version or pipeline of Killgore.
D.

The District Court Erred in Applying Idaho Code Section 42-912.

Despite the fact that Mullinix entered into a binding and enforceable Settlement Agreement
which provided them with their own water rights so long as they are downstream of the Killgore
point of diversion, the district court found that "Mullinix is entitled to have Killgore fomish water
to the Mullinix parcel based on Idaho Code § 42-912." (R. pg. 230, paragraphs 8-9) This decision
of the district court is not supported by the evidence and is an error of law.
Idaho Code§ 42-912 provides the following:
Any person, company or corporation owning or controlling any canal or irrigation
works for the distribution of water under a sale or rental thereof, shall furnish
water to any person or persons owning or controlling any land under such canal or
irrigation works for the purpose of irrigating such land or for domestic purposes,
upon a proper demand being made and reasonable security being given for the
payment thereof: provided, that no person, company or corporation shall contract
to deliver more water than such person, company or corporation has a title to,
by reason of having complied with the laws in regard to the appropriation of the
public waters of this state.
(Emphasis added).
However, Killgore is not an entity such as a canal company or irrigation district which
procured water rights for the sale, rental or distribution as intended to be addressed in LC.§ 42-912.
[nstead, Killgore is a property owner that developed its own water rights for the irrigation of its own
lands. This is no different from many other private property owners, farmers or irrigators. Then,
some forty years later when the Killgore's began dividing and selling portions of the land it did not
transform Killgore into a canal company or irrigation district under LC. § 42-912. Killgore simply
began selling portions of the land.

There is no sale or rental of water and Killgore cannot be

magically transformed into something it is not.
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Moreover, the application of LC. § 42-912 is defeated by the fact that Mullinix waived or
relinquished any right to the Killgore diversion and pipeline as part of the Settlement Agreement in
which Mullinix unambiguously agreed that the Mullinix point of diversion would be below the
Killgore point of diversion.

There was valid consideration for the Settlement Agreement, the

Settlement Agreement was reviewed and approved by Mullinix's present counsel and it remains
binding and valid. Mullinix cannot claim that they have their own water right and own point of
diversion as agreed in the Settlement Agreement, and then turn around and suggest that they can
utilize the diversion and pipeline of Killgore simply because they do not want to spend the time and
money to build their own diversion works and delivery system. The district court's decision cannot
be reconciled with the Settlement Agreement and Mullinix having title to his own water right.
1.

The Killgore Water Right is Not for Sale or Rental.

Again, Killgore is not a company organized for the purpose of operating and maintaining a
canal system for the sale or rental of water, which is the purpose for which LC. § 42-912 was
enacted. Instead, Killgore is a corporation which was organized for the purpose of conducting the
business of operating a fruit ranch. This is distinguishable from the situations and cases under LC.
§ 42-912 which involve irrigation districts or canal companies organized and formed for the purpose
of constructing irrigation canals and delivering irrigation water to landowners/shareholders. See
Gerber v. Nampa & Meridian Irrigation District, 16 Idaho 1, 100 P. 80 (1910) (involving an

irrigation district); Bardsly v. Boise Irrigation & land Co., 8 Idaho 155, 67 P. 428 (1901) (involving
a canal company then irrigation district); State v. Twin Falls-Salmon River Land and Water Co., 30
Idaho 41, 166 P. 220 (1916) (involving a Carey Act canal company). The district court's decision
portrays Killgore as something it is not and has never been.
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Killgore has never been a water

company, canal company, irrigation district or other company formed for the purpose of establishing
water rights and/or constructing and operating a conveyance system.
This distinction was made clear in Clear Springs Foods, Inc. v. Spackman, 150 Idaho 790,
806, 252 P.3d 71, 87 (2011) when it described the distinction as follows:
As we stated in [Mellon v. Great Western Beet Sugar Co., 21 Idaho 353, 122 P. 30
( 1912) ], "The framers of our Constitution evidently meant to distinguish settlers who
procure a water right under sale, rental, or distribution, from that class of water users
who procure their water right by appropriation and diversion directly from the natural
stream." Id. at 359, 122 P. at 31.
Admittedly, the court in Clear Springs Foods was analyzing sections 1, 4 and 5 of Article
XV of the Idaho Constitution which, as explained, supra, also have language relating to the sale,
rental and distribution of water rights. However, the point is still applicable that those who procure
water rights by the sale, rental, or distribution are different and distinct from those who appropriate
and divert the water directly from the stream. In other words, any appropriation and diversion from
Joe Creek when their water right was procured was by Killgore, for Killgore's own benefit and
property, and not by or for others. This is consistent with the statement of Mr. Claggett that the
protections were not applicable ··to a case of a water right where a man takes water out and puts it
upon his own farm."

See Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of Idaho,

1889," Volume II, p. 1180.
More specifically, and as provided in the facts stated herein, Killgore is not "selling or
renting" water.

The contracts which Killgore has entered into with new owners allow the new

owners the option to "share" the water. There is no "sale" or "rental" of the water. The testimony
was that Killgore entered into the Irrigation Agreements with the lot owners, not to profit, but rather
to collect and share in the maintenance of the system (Tr. pgs. 395-397, Ins. 4-17).
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At one point Killgore held all of the land and water and used it for agricultural purposes.
This is no different than all private water users that have established their own water rights for the
diversion and use on their own lands. It just so happens that it has been selling off portions of those
lands and it continues to maintain the system for the benefit of those buyers. This is also no different
than many landowners/water users which eventually sell portions of their land or develop their lands
into subdivisions. In fact, a homeowners association may be established to operate and maintain
a delivery system after a parcel of property has been subdivided. However, doing so does not tum
them into a company which is ob 1igated to al low every adjacent property owner to share their system.
The ramifications of district court's decision is that any company that later sells off a portion of its
property, but maintains an interest in the operation of the delivery system, would be obligated to
allow any adjoining property owners to share in the irrigation system. This is not what LC.§ 42-912
intended and it is simply not applicable to this matter.

2.

Idaho Code§ 42-912 Does Not Require Killgore to Furnish Water for Which it
Does not Hold Title.

Another aspect of LC. § 42-912 which is specifically provided in the statute is that it:
assuming for arguments' sake, the statute was applicable, no one can contract to deliver more water
than is available. For the same reasons involving the principles of estoppel and waiver, discussed

supra, Mullinix themselves prevented the application of the statute when they claimed and were
subsequently decreed their own water right. Killgore no longer has title to the portion of the water
right for Mullinix's property and Killgore's water right is limited to the acres and water available to
irrigate the lands under the Killgore water right (which does not include the Mullinix property).
Killgore plainly and simply do not own title to the water sufficient to deliver the water to the
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Mullinix property. In other words, the plain and unambiguous language of LC. § 42-912 specifically
states that the entity cannot deliver more water than it as "title" to. Killgore does not have "title"
to the extra water Mullinix wants delivered through the pipeline and there is no evidence that
Killgore or the subdivision lot owners have forfeited or abandoned any of the water right to which
they do hold title. Again, LC. § 42-912 does not provide the relief Mullinix is requesting.
Since Mullinix own title to their own water right to divert water from Joe Creek, they are
essentially requesting Killgore to deliver their water right to them. Idaho Code § 42-912 is not
intended to require a third person, whether it is a canal company or not for arguments' sake, to
deliver a separate water right for their benefit.

The plain reading of the statute prevents the

application Mullinix is requesting, and which the district court concluded, to require Killgore to
furnish Mullinix their own water right.

E.

The District Court Erred in Finding that Killgore Tortiously Injured Mullinix.

The district court held that Killgore tortiously injured the property of Mullinix by
disconnecting Mullinix's attempted diversions from the pipeline owned and operated by Killgore.
The district court further found that any damages claimed by Mullinix were offset by the damages
sustained by Killgore as result of Mullinix's illegal and unauthorized attempts to connect to the
pipeline. In other words, the district court attempted to "split the baby" and found in favor of both
parties. Killgore submit that the district erred in that any conclusion that Killgore tortiously injured
the property of Mullinix is not supported by the evidence and is an error oflaw.
The evidence discussed above is clear that Mullinix has no prior right to the Killgore
diversion and pipeline. In fact, Mullinix acknowledged this in 2007 when Mr. Mullinix apologized
after their first attempt to illegally connect to the pipeline. Mullinix further acknowledged no such
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right and then sought to be furnished water under LC. § 42-912. Mullinix also acknowledged that
they had no right to connect to the pipeline when they attempted to do so after the Settlement
Agreement. This was after Mullinix had specifically agreed that they would have their own water
right and own point of diversion below Killgore. However, without installing such a diversion,
Mullinix still irrigated from the pipeline without the consent of Killgore after the Settlement
Agreement.
Again, it is not disputed that Killgore own and operate the pipeline. The disconnecting of
Mullinix from the pipeline when they had no right to connect and had agreed to a point of diversion
below the Killgore point of diversion was not tortious. To the contrary, Killgore were maintaining
their rights and had the right to disconnect Mullinix. See I. C. § 4 2-1102 (providing that no structures
or encroachments shall be installed within an irrigation right-of-way without the right-of-way
owner's written permission); Pioneer Irrigation District v. City of Caldwell, 153 Idaho 593,288
P.3d 810 (2012) (holding that an irrigation district had the right to self help under I.C. § 42-1209,
which contains the same language as LC.§ 42-1102).
Accordingly, Killgore request that this Court reverse the decision of the district court that
Killgore tortiously injured the property of Mullinix by disconnecting their illegal and unauthorized
connections to the pipeline owned by Killgore. In doing so, Killgore further request that this Court
remand the matter to direct the district court to award the damages for breach of the Settlement
Agreement, interference and conversion in which the district court erroneously found were offset by
Mullinix's claim for tortious interference.
F.

The District Court Erred in Concluding that Mullinix was the Prevailing Partv.
Killgore's argument with regard to this issue is simply that if this Court reverses the decision
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of the district court as respectfully requested herein, then Mullinix would clearly not be the
prevailing party under Rule 54( d)(l )(B) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and the district
court's award of costs to Mullinix should also be reversed. Killgore contend that it should be the
prevailing party, as it should be on appeal.

V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Killgore respectfully requests that the district court's decision be
reversed with respect to its decision that Mullinix has the right to use the diversion works or pipeline
owned and controlled by Killgore. Further, Mullinix has no prior right to the diversion works or
pipeline owned by Killgore, or, in the alternative, waived and abandoned any such right when they
executed the Settlement Agreement in which they unambiguously agreed to have a point of diversion
inferior and below the Killgore point of diversion. The district court erroneously concluded that
Mullinix has a right to use the Killgore diversion and/or pipeline under Article XV, Section 4 of the
Idaho Constitution or LC. § 42-10 I because, again, Mullinix had no prior right which must be
guaranteed.

The district court also erroneously concluded that I.C. § 42-912 is applicable to the

facts and circumstances in this case. Mullinix have their own water right, agreed it would be below
the point of diversion of Killgore, and cannot now claim they must be furnished their water right
under LC. § 42-912. The district court's decision that Killgore tortiously injured Mullinix by
disconnecting their illegal and unauthorized connections was in error and should be reversed.
Finally, the district court's decision that Mullinix was the prevailing party and should be awarded
costs should be reversed.
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SECTION STRICKEN OUT

ARTICLJ!; XV., SECTION ,J

sequent locator except a little labor to hunt up the
records.

SECTION.

!

, Mr. _S~EET.
do n?t see my way clear to support
the add1t10nal sect10n offered by Mr. Heyburn, because
l do not see that the person who takes up the land is
comp~lled to use it. I do not believe in any Jaw that
pe_n~uts a :11an to appropriate a stream of water or a
mmmg claim or anything else and do nothing with it
an~. at the same time prevent other people from usin~
thell" property adjoining it by simply appropriating the
la~id or the water or anything else. Perhaps that
~mght be treated by the legislature in such a way that
if a person were to take up a tract of land as suggested
by Mr .. H~yburn, and did not utilize the water within
~~rtam tune he should lose it. But on the broad propos1t10n that he can take this land and hold it as long as
he pl~ases an~ practically, if not absolutely, prevent
me'.1 from makmg improvements farther up the <rulcb it
strikes me as bad policy.
"'
'
( "Question, question." )
The vote was taken on Mr. Heyburn's proposed section and the motion was lost.
Mr. CLAGGE!TT. I move the adoption of Section 3
as amended. (Seconded. Vote and carried).

a

SECTION STRICKEN OUT.

Section 4 was read, and it was moved and seconded
Lhat it be adopted.
Mr. CLAGGETT. I move to strike it out for the
reason that it is all embodied in the Bill of Rights
which we had up the other day. It is a duplication.
(Seconded.)
. ~r. STANDROD. I will state further that the secLion m the Bill of Rights, the gentleman will remember,
was prepared as a substitute and offered after these
reports had been prepared by the joint committee on
Agr\culture and Mining. ("Question.") (Vote.)
1 he CHAIR. The chair is in doubt. ( On the rising
vote, ayes 24, nays 3; and Section 4 is stricken out).

UT/

4.

Section 5 ( 4) was read.
Mr. CLAGGETT. Mr. Chairmau, in the fourth line
there is a typographicai'' error. Strike out the word
"have" and insert- the word "once."
The CHAIR. lt there is no objection it will be done.
l t is so ordered ..
Mr. HAMPTON. I have an amendment, Mr. Chairman. If amended it will read like this: "Whenever
any Wf,t-ters have been or shall be used for agricultural
purposes, under an appropriation, sale, rental, or distribution thereof, such appropriation, sale, rental or distribution shall be deemed an exclusive dedication to such
use; and whenever such waters so dedicated shall have
once been sold, rented or distributed to any person who
has settled upon or improved land for agricultural purposes with the view of receiving the benellt of such
water nnder such dedication, such person, his heirs,
executors, administrators, successors or assigns shall
not thereafter, without his consent, be deprived of the
annual use of the same, when needed for domestic purposes, or to irrigate the land so settled upon or
improved, upon payment therefor, and compliance with
such equitable terms and conditions as to the quantity
used and times of use, as may be prescribed by law."
It will be seen that the rights granted in the latter part
of the section, do not appear to read, as it appears, to
apply to appropriations, but only to such rights as may
be granted or sold.
Mr. GRAY. Mr. Chairman, I cannot 8ee that it
should be a dedication to such use. Suppose 1 hire
water for a year. Is that a dedication to that use'? I
cannot understand this.
SE:CRIDTARY reads: I move to amend section 3
by striking out the words "appropriated or" in the first
line, and by inserting after the word "under" in the
second line the words "an appropriation" and after the
word "such" in the second line the word "appropriation." Hampton.

l l.'/8
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ARTlCLg XV., SECTION 4

Mr. GRAY. Then shall it be deemed an exclul:iive
dedication to such use. If I have a ditch I may sell it to
a man for a year, and if he doesn't want it any longer,
I won't sell it to him; but it seems by this it would
make it a dedication for that particular use. Perhaps
somebody can explain it to me.
Mr. CLAGGETT. It is easy enough explained.
Mr. GRAY. Thank you.
Mr CLAGGE'l1T. I will state to the committee that
the heart of this bill lies in sections 5 ( 4) and G ( 5) as
a practical measure.
This portion of section 5 ( 4)
amounts to this: that whenever these canal owners-if
the gentleman will see "for agricultural purposes under
a sale, rental or distribution thereof"-whenever one
of these large canals is taken out for the purpose of
selling, renting or distributing water, or the appropriation is made hereafter for that purpose, and that after
that has once been done, inasqrnch as priorities will
immediately spring up along the line of that canal,
even before the canal is located; for instance, if a company should start in here to take a large quantity of
water out to supply a given section of country, and
should appropriate or give notice to the world that they
were appropriating it for agricultural purposes "under
a sale, rental or distribution thereof," then immediately,
just as soon as the ditch was surveyed, people would
come in and begin to locate farms and improve them
right along the line of the ditch; and therefore it is
necessary in order to protect them, inasmuch as they
have spent this money in settling there under a promise,
which was made by the company that the water should
be used for agricultural purposes-that the water should
not be allowed to be diverted from that purpose and
applied to the running of manufactories or anything
else of that sort.
Mr. GRAY. Suppose he won't pay for it.
Mr CLAGGE'l'T. It is dedicated to the use, and
when it has once been sold to any one particular party
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in one year, then he shall have the right to demand it
annually thereafte1· upon paying for it.
Mr. GRAY. Put that in ..
Mr. CLAGGETT. 1t istin. You don't suppose the
committee was going to give a man the right to take
water from a canal ,without paying therefor'? "Upon
payment therefor, and compliance with such equi\able
terms and cond1tioi1S as to the quantity used and tunes
of nse, as may be prescribed by law."
("Que~tion, question.")
.
,
The chair put the question upon the adopt10n of the
amendment offered by Mr. Hampton. (Vote and lost.)
Mr. GllA Y. I move that the section be stricken out.
Mr. POE:. I move to amend that by adopting the
section as it is.
The CHAIR. The motion to strike out met with no
.
second.
l\1r. CLAGETT. I move the alloption of the sectwn.
The chair put the question on the adoption of t1ection
5 ( Ll) . ( Vote and carried.)
.
Mr. SWJimrr. I would like to ask 1f that word
"have" in the fourth line is ehanged?
Mr. CLAGGETT. That ·is corrected to the wonl
"once."
SECTION

5.

Section 6 (5) was read.
Moved and seconded that Section 6 ( 5) be adopted.
ALLEN. I call attention to a clerical :IT~~,; the
word "proceeding" in line 3 should be "pr~cedmg.
Mr. GRAY. (After reading the sect10n.). I have
a farm away down here; I sell water when [ have a
plenty, but I want to use it if I need it all. Now, what
effect does this have on it'! In the event I have more
than I need for my own use I sell it. Ht~ve I go_t to
sell it all the time? What is the vi~w of t~11s corn_nutt:e
?
·rhis bill is a puzzling bill, I will adrmt thctt
on ti.1at .
•
·
· l t
right here, and it will puzzle b~th. the 1_eg1_s_:i ur~s
and the people after they have got 1t rnto practic,tl use.

Mr.

1 mo

ARTICLJ;; X V. 1 SECTION 5

l believe the statute as it now stands should be corrected; that is, if a ditch is built for the purpose of
selling water, that they should have it from the head
down that you could not cross a man's land without
giving it to him; it makes no difference when his location was; and that it should be used as it comes down,
Lhe first man has the first right, provided he pays for
the ·water. When he complies with the requirements he
is the man that shall have it Jirst; and so it shall go
down, without saying any Lime of location of lands; I
don't believe that should have anything to do with it.
Mr. CLAGGE'Trl'. Mr. Chairmau, both of these sections apply to the same condition of things. Neither
one of them applies to a ease of a \Nater right where a
man takes water out and puts it upon his own farm.
!l applies to cases only m: both sections specify, sayinglo those cases where ,vaten-i are "appropriaLed or m1ed
for agricultural purposes under a sale, rental or distribution." The first section protects the person who
comes in, by making it "an exclusive dedication" to
agricultural uses after it has been so appropriated and
so used. But then the question come in with regard to
wher-e there is more than one person who settles beneath
the line of one of those agricultural ditches, which are
constructed for the purpose of Relling the water or renting it or distributing it, or which are used for that
purpose, although they may not originally have been 80
constructed. Now, when these two or three or four or
five or six or seven parties eorne in, what are you going
to do? Are you going to give the first man the right
to the water? Suppose the first man comes along and
the first year he breaks up and calls for water for
twenty acres of land. The next year he calls for water
for forly acres, and the next year for sixty acres, and
Lhe next year for two or three hundred acres, enough
to practically exhaust it. Anyone ca11 see that by recognizing absolute priority of right in that way, that the
first person settling under the line of the ditch would
have the fir:cit call on the water to the extent that he

ARTICLE XV., SECTION ti

118l

might be able lo go ahead and improve the land afterwards. This thing has got to be regulated by statute,
;'nd the corn,titution proposes simply to point out the
line of the principles witl('in which legislation must
be carried on; that is to say, to recognize the right of
priority in the order t)f time of settlement or improvement, as the cafe rnay be; and then when the water
run:-1 short or anything of that kind, it has got to be
regulated from time Lo time and from year to year as
the legislatures meet, and as experience shall suggest,
in such manner as to promote the greatest good to the.
greatest nnrnber, liearing in mind constantly the fact o.J
the prior right of the first man as well as the necess1Ue8 of the second, and you cannot get it any closer than
1liat.
( "question, question." )
The question was put upo11 the adoption or section
G (G). Vote and carried.
SIDCTJON

G.

Sec Lion 7 ( fi) was read.
Mr. SHOUP. Mr. Chairman, I would like to call
altenlion to section L1, if it is in order, which was
stricken out, and which I have been readin? aga_in.
When the article on Bill of Rights was under d1scuss1011
you yourself called the attention of . the comrnittee in
regard to a single person owning a piece of land below
ev~rybody else,·· and asked, "Do you think it is true. t:s
to its giving him the right to bring water aeross to lus
Jand '/" It was then stated that this section 4 covered
that, and 110 w, in committee of the Whole it was. agreed
it should be adopted. But now this very section has
been stricken out.
.
Mr. MORGAN. It appeared so to me at the tH:1e.
J thought this seetion was necessary I as also the secl:lon
in Lhe Bill of Rights.
Mr. AINSLIE. Well, I think the section was rea_d
awhile ago from the Bill of Rights that covers what 1s
in this section.
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Mr. CLAGGETT. Well, we must be very careful
that it does.
Mr. AINSLIE. I will call for the reading of section
1£1 in the Bill of Rights.
Mr. CLAGGETT. The inquiry of the gentleman
from Custer is with regard to an individual having the
right to go across another's land'!
Mr. SHOUP. Yes, the right of way across a farm
above him.
l\!Ir. CLAGGET'r. I am satisfied that is broad
enough to cover it in the Bill of Rights. "Any useful
or beneficial purpose."
SI~CRE'rARY reads section H of the Bill of Rights.
Mr. CLAGGETT. That clearly covers it. '!'here is
no limit on the character of ditches or the number of
people who may have thern dug.
The CHAIR. (Mr. Morgan.) It occurs to me it
could only come in that section by inference or implication. lt certainly does not mean that one person shall
take the property of another for the purpose of constructing his ditch over the land.
Mr. STANDROD. It certainly provides a right of
way for an individual or number of persons or corporations. It is a broad clause. It does not confine it to
an individual or any number of persons; it is intended
to cover the whole ground, and I think it does.
Mr. CLAGGE'l"r.
(After reading section 14 as
amended.) It is as broad as the E:nglish language can
be made, and covers every case that the legislature does
not see fit to except; or rather, it covers every case th<~
legislature might see fit to embrace.
SECRETARY again reads sectiw1 7 (G).
Moved and seconded that section 7 ( G) be adopted,
Vote and carried.
Mr. AINSLIE. I move that the article as ameNled
now be adopted. (Seconded. Vote and carried).
'l'he CHAIR. What is the pleasure of the eom rn iUee '.'
Mr. McCONNELL. [ move the committee now t·is(,,
report progress and recommend the adoption of tlie

article as adopted !Jy committee of the Who\(·.
011(\ecl.

118:i

{::-~ec-

Vote and carrie<l).
CONVENTION ·IN

t

SESSION.

Mr. McConnell in the chair.
Mr. MORGAN. JV[r. President, your committee of
the Whole House having under consideration the n·porL ·
of the committee on Manufactures, Agriculture and Irrigation, have adopte<l and recommend for a,loptinn
sections \ and 2 and "1, as amended in commiti ee of the
Whole, and recommend the adoption of the artide as
amended.
The CHAIR The question is now upon the adoption
of the article as an1ended. The secretary will read it
as amended, section by section.
Mr. AINSLIE. I move that it lay on the table and
that the convention now adjourn until tomorrow morning at nine o'clock.
Mr. CLAGGET'l'. l would like to suggest to the
gentleman from Boise that I do not think it will take
very long to get through with this. We have an
engrossing clerk, and it is a good deal o:f work to do it,
and if we pass this now in ten or fifteen minutes, Rhe
can do the work in the meantime.
Mr. AINSLIE. Very well, I will withdraw my
motion.
SECTION

1.

Section l was read, and it was moved and secorHtell
Urnt it be adopted. (Vote and carried.)
SECTION

2.

Section 2 was read, and it was moved and seconded
that iL he adopted. ( Vote and carried.)
SECTION

3.

Section B was read by the secretary as amended,
Moved and seconded that section B as arnended be
adopted. (Vote and carried.)
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SECTION

4.

Section 5 ( 4) was read, and it was moved alld see011ded that Section 5 ( 4) be adopted. Vote and carried.
SECTION

SECTION

OUT.

Section tl was read Ly the secretary.
Mr. HASBROUCK. '!'hat section was stricken out.
Mr. SHOUP. I understand that has been stricken
out, Lut I am not satisfied with it. The provision in tlie
Bill of Rights reads that "private property may be
taken for public use, Lut not until a just compensation,"
eLc., and then goes on and says what a public use is.
Now, I don't understand that that can be construed
that one may use all the water belonging to one man for
a public use; and therefore .I think it is necessary to
have section 4 in the constitution in order to give an
individual the right to use the water. I think it is
importaut that that section should be in the constitution. I move that section 4 be adopted. (Seconded.)
Mr. AINSLIE. Mr. President, l do not see any use
of repeating in this constitution the same thing twice.
That article in the Bill of Rights, section 1'!, as the
president says, is as broad as the English language can
put it, and I do not see that we can put it any stronger,
and it would be foolish to repeat the same thing in these
articles of the constitution. I think it is strong enough
for any use on earth, and I do not see any ne(~d of
repeating it.
( "(luestion, question." )
The question was put upon the adoption oJ' section ,1 ·
heretofore stricken out in committee of, the Whole.
Vote and lost, and Section 4 is stricken out in convention.

5.

Section 6 (5) was read, and it was moved and seconded that Section G ( 5) be adopted. Vote and carried.
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6.

Section 7 (G) was read and it was moved and seconded that Section 7 ( 6)
adopted. Vote and c~uTied.
The CHAIR. What is now the pleasure of tlns convention with regard to this matter?

~e

•,

ARTICLE XV. ADOPTED.

Mr. HEYBURN. I move that we adopt the entire
article. (Motion seconded. Vote and carried).
Mr. , HEYBURN. I move that the article be engrossed, passed to third reading and set for tomorrow
at 2 o'clock. (Seconded. Vote and carried).
Mr. HEYBURN. Mr. President, I move now that
we go into committee of the Whole for the further consideration of the report of the committee on Public and
Private Corporations. We have but one section left, and
I think we can dispose of it and have it engrossed.
'l'he CHAIR. I will swear in the young lady who
was elected as engrossing clerk.
The motion was then put that the convention resolve
itself into committee of the Whole for further consideration of the report of the committee on Public and
Private Corporations. (Vote and carried.)
COMMITTEE

OF

THE

WHOLE

IN

SESSION.

Mr. McConnell in the chair.
ARTICLE

XL, SECTION 18.- PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS.

The CHAIR. Gentlemen of the committee, the subject of your consideration is section 21 (18). of the
~-eport of the committee on Public and Private Corporations.
Mr. REID. Mr. Chairman, who offered this amendment?
Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Mayhew presented it.
Mr. HEID. I would ask unanimous consent that the
matter go over untB he can be present.

